Ethnic segmentation in Sri Lanka evolved from the colonial and post-colonial experiences that divided the population along racial lines. In the pre-colonial period, different linguistic groups coexisted in relative harmony for centuries despite dynastic feuding, intense rivalry among kings, and inter-caste conflicts. The initial categorisation of the population in ethnic terms came from European theories of racial classifications; these divisions have unfortunately persisted after decolonisation with devastating consequences.
Though socially concerned scholars (Committee for Rational Development, 1983; Spencer, 1990; Jeganathan & Ismail, 1995; Roberts, 1977; 1994; 1997; Obeyesekere, 1988; Tambiah, 1992; Bastian, 1994) have belatedly begun to deconstruct these divisive consciousnesses, these nationalisms have already become invested with considerable emotion.
They are supported by strong mythic beliefs that defy rational argument. Ultimately they are “imagined” (Anderson, 2006), or what Marxists call false consciousness, or what Buddhist and Hindu philosphers would call maya. As Allport (1958) points out: “A subtle and attractive mystery surrounds the concept of blood... This symbolism has no supportfrom science. Race is a fashionable focus for the propaganda of alarmists and demagogues... Racists
seem to be people who out of their own anxieties,
Amongst scholars and academics who trace the origins of ethnic consciousness, most agree that its current manifestation in Sri Lanka is of recent origin. Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic identities are not genetically inherent. Low Country and Kandyan Sinhalese used to be considered different groups only a century ago, more so than the Sinhalese- Tamil demarcation that, at the time, overlapped in many castes without apparent tension. The sharp divide in Sinhalese-Tamil identities evolved from a confluence of socio-cultural, political, economic, ecological, contextual, and psychological factors.
Aspiring leaders and interested parties have astutely fanned and manipulated these points of contention to serve their own ends.
According to Sivaram (Whitaker, 2007), modern ruling elites have found ethno-nationalism to be the most effective principle to organize and govern emerging modern nation-states. The emotional loyalty and passions it generates make it an easy mechanism to garner votes, obedience, sacrifice, and control. Gilroy (2000) eloquently opposes the “emergence and entrenchment of biopolitical power as a means and technique for managing the life of populations, states and societies.” Biopolitical power is based on ethno-nationalism. It is a form of ‘New Racism’ in the post-colonial world, arising out of beliefs in discrete and exclusive racial and national identities that are then linked to a genomic, essentialist fundamentalism.
Today’s ethno-nationalist politicians and academics in Sri Lanka have used these divisive ideas to influence peoples’ perceptions of themselves as part of exclusive ethnic categories. Sri Lankan parliamentary politics have produced ethnically-based tyrannies of the majority. Aspiring leaders have learned to appeal to ethnic passions as an easy route to power, thus prolonging the war between the Sinhalese and the Tamils that has left deep emotional scars on individuals, families, and communities.
Moreover, the acrimonious debate as to which ethnic group came to Sri Lanka first, which features prominently in the discourse of group divisions based on historic grievances, is laden with misunderstanding. No evidence exists to support the Sinhalese argument that their group came to Sri Lanka first as an ‘Aryan’ migration from North India, nor for the Tamils’ claim to South Indian origins. Rather, the historical record shows that the island’s local inhabitants adapted to influences from mainland India fomented by the movement of traders, craftsman, skilled workers, mercenaries, prisoners of war, and brides in both directions (Indrapala, 2007).
Further, migrants came not only from various parts of India but also from Java, Malaysia, Arabia, and more recently, Europe. People also migrated within Sri Lanka and freely switched from one language to another. Thus ethnic, linguistic, and religious identifies were fluid, overlapping, and inclusive.
I contend that the only path to reconciliation is to make people aware of the value of other ethnic constructions by breaking down and rebuilding these historically-rooted but ultimately perceived identities. However, before this can take place, the underpinning socio-economic factors that have worked to maintain polarised attitudes must be transformed. Taking these steps is the only way can we begin to build a vision for lasting peace in Sri Lanka’s future.
The Colonial Origins of the Conflict
The extreme polarisation of the country’s two main groups, the Tamils and the Sinhalese, is the largest obstacle standing in the way of a lasting solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic strife. The basic divide is one of language. Seventyfour percent of the population is categorized as Sinhalese speakers. Of these, over 93 percent are Buddhist. The remainder of the population is mostly composed of the 25.7 percent Tamil-speaking minority, about half of whom are Sri Lankan Tamils. Almost 29 percent are Muslims and the remaining 21 percent are Hill Country Tamils. There is a negligible number of Burghers, Malays and Veddas that account for the remaining 1.5 percent of the country’s population.
The source of the highly charged division between the Sinhalese and the Tamils can be linked to the cycle of ethnically-motivated inequality that was experienced by both sides during the past century. Under British rule, Tamils were perceived as holding an unfair advantage, since they were disproportionately better educated and better employed by the state. However, the situation was inversed in other sectors such as commerce and agriculture, as the arid and underdeveloped land of the northeast Tamil territories lacked the level of resources available to the rest of the island.
The disproportionate number of Tamils in these sectors led to affirmative action campaigns by the subsequent Sinhalese governments. In time, however, the government overshot the mark and Tamils began to see themselves as disadvantaged in relation to the Sinhalese in terms of government investment (mainly in education) and felt themselves slipping from the privileged position they had previously enjoyed in certain key areas. They felt they had become “2nd class citizens” (Schwarz, 1988). Now, not only the state but the private sector and even some diplomatic missions discriminate against Tamils in their hiring practices, as well as when issuing visas and scholarships. While employing Sinhalese workers engenders good relations with and benefits from the state for employers, hiring Tamils can bring trouble due to costly intrusions by the police and armed services, who frequently arrest and detain Tamil employees.
The Construction of Ethnic Consciousnesses
An interesting characteristic of the ethno-national discourse between the Sinhalese and Tamil groups is that the majority and minority ideologies are, in many ways, mirror images of one another. Both ideologies define the ‘other’ in terms of exclusion and opposition. War, then, becomes a contest between hegemonic ideologies for supremacy in an attempt to impose a particular construction of social reality. However, both operate within the same paradigm of ethno-nationalism by producing a master narrative that is hegemonic within the group and totalitarian in nature. In a politically contested, polarised, and violent situation, attempts to transcend these narratives can be taken as treason; the mentality becomes one of either being with or against the group, with little room for flexibility or compromise.
The majority Sinhalese Buddhist consciousness has evolved to identify itself with a territorial claim to the whole island (Sinhadeepa), as well as the Sinhalese language and the Buddhist religion. However, Sinhalese Christians form about seven percent of the Sinhalese population and mostly share the beliefs of the dominant Sinhalese consciousness. Many Sinhalese nationalist elite leaders came from this social stratum, and later converted to Buddhism.
According to Kumari Jayawardena (1986), the Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness is based on:
1) The doctrine of the primacy and superiority of the Sinhalese `race' as the original, true inhabitants of the island. This is linked to a myth that the Sinhalese were `Aryan' migrants from Bengal.
2) The concept that the Sinhalese race has been placed in a special relationship to Buddhism as its protector. Appeals to save Buddhism from infidels are frequent in the rhetoric of Sinhalese ethno-nationalism. In recent years, some Sinhalese leaders have gone as far as calling for a dharma yudhaya, or holy war, to protect the Buddhist religion.
3) The feeling of insecurity that stems from the fact that, unlike the other minority groups which have ethnic links with other countries, the Sinhalese are a regional minority that does not exist outside of Sri Lanka. This is particularly true in reference to the Tamils, who, while a minority within Sri Lanka, identify ethnically with the 50 million Tamils living in South India.
Despite the relatively recent emergence of the conception of this identity, it has profoundly influenced today’s Sinhalese people. Violence and political action against those perceived to threaten this identity is commonplace (Gunawardana, 1990).
Prominent Sinhalese have reinterpreted history to arouse strong feelings of injustice. An example of this is the 1956 All Ceylon Buddhist Congress’s Committee of Inquiry report, “The Betrayal of Buddhism,” written while Sri Lanka was still under British rule (Tambiah, 1992). The sentiments expressed in this document later grew into virulent Sinhalese Buddhist ethnocentrism, culminating in the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom.
Anthropologists Obeyesekere (1988, with Gombrich, 1988), Kapferer (1988; 1997), and Tambiah (1992) have elucidated how this identity came into being from a deeper intra-psychic, socio-cultural perspective. Ancient Buddhist chronicles like the Mahavamsa and the Dipavamsa as well as many myths and legends, such as those of Duttugemunu and Vijaya, have been reconstituted and imbibed with new meanings in the current socioeconomic and political context to identify the Tamils as the archetypal “dangerous other” (Nissan & Stirrat, 1990). These beliefs have become deeply ingrained in the Sinhalese psyche. The collective fear of the other manifested itself in periodic mob violence against Tamils while providing the impetus behind the continuing machinations of state terror. The current model of extreme Sinhalese Buddhist ideology and politics are represented by Jathika Chinthanaya or “national consciousness” (Goonewardena, 2007), which had maneuvered itself into the driving seat of the Sri Lankan state under the Rajapakse regime and through the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP/NPM) parties (UTHR-J, 2008).
Unsurprisingly, modern Sri Lankan Tamil identity developed as a reaction to the increasing dominance of the Sinhalese Buddhist identity (Wilson, 2000; Arasaratnam, 1998). Successive Sinhalese leaders rose to power by exploiting ethno-nationalism and then proceeded to use the state machinery to promote Sinhalese superiority. This was accomplished by enforcing Sinhalese as the only official language in 1956, enshrining Buddhism as the state religion in the 1972 constitution, and discriminating in favor of the Sinhalese in educational and employment opportunities as well as in the allocation of resources and land. These leaders also encouraged periodic mobviolence against the Tamils, notably in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983. In turn, the Tamils feared that their existence and identity as a separate and unique group was under threat. Furthermore, claims to a Tamil homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka clashed with Sinhalese perceptions of territoriality. It was only after the 1983 pogrom that the Tamil resistance became militant and fascist in turn. Tamil nationalist groups adopted methods of terror against the state, Sinhalese and Muslim communities, and those in the Tamil community reluctant to participate in the Tamil ethnonationalist narrative.
Like its Sinhalese counterpart, Sri Lankan Tamil ethno-nationalism developed over the past century. Over the course of decades of discrimination and violent repression, Tamils have acquired a minority complex based on their collective experience of persecution at the hands of the state. This complex has often led them to hide their identity in public areas outside of their traditional territory in order to avoid attracting unwanted attention. Despite these efforts, they are frequently required to identify their ethnic background at military checkpoints and are subject to government-sanctioned house-to-house searches. The recent detention and internment of close to 280,000 Tamil internally displaced persons (IDPs) exemplifies the outcomes of this anti-Tamil state aggression.
Many Tamils who consider these conditions intolerable have fled the country, spreading ethnonationalist sentiments throughout the Tamil diaspora. The spread of Tamil nationalism and its linkages to a pan-Tamil nationalism are already apparent in Sri Lanka, across the straits in India’s Tamil Nadu province, and, increasingly, worldwide. Large pro-Tamil movements exist in Western countries such as Canada, the US, the UK, Australia, France, Sweden, Norway and Germany. With the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, there are now growing efforts to form a more unified transnational Tamil movement. Those who support the establishment of a separate Tamil Eelam state argue for the group’s entitlement to ethnic sovereignty by referencing the ‘purity’ of the Dravidian race, the descendants of the ancient Mohenjadaro civilization, the greatness of the 5000-year-old Tamil language, and the glories of the Chola Empire.
This exclusive ethnocentric identity alienates other minorities within Tamil-speaking areas and has resulted in the expulsion and massacre of Muslims in the north and east. Eastern Tamils, who perceive themselves as being historically marginalised by their northern brethren and feel that their identity, history, culture, and problems are somewhat different, voice fears of being dominated by the northern Jaffna Tamils (Reddiar, 1997). Such fears resurfaced once again with the internal LTTE-Karuna split in 2005. Thus, for all their nationalistic rhetoric, the Tamils have not demonstrated the capacity to overcome a narrow ethnocentric consciousness and develop
a tolerant, multicultural one.
As a reaction to these cycles of ethnic identification, exclusiveness, and persecution, other minorities within the country have begun to assert their identities. In particular, the Muslim community has undergone a rapid political awakening as a reaction to local ethnic hostilities. Political parties and a extremist youth militant organisation have surfaced to represent Muslim interests. The electoral success of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress has consolidated
requests for an autonomous Muslim territory in eastern Sri Lanka. Furthering this paper’s thesis regarding the contextual determinism of ethnic consciousness, Sri Lankan Muslim identity is increasingly taking on an international dimension. Muslims are now beginning to identify and perceive themselves as members of the international Muslim community, which transcends national boundaries.
The Institutionalisation of Difference
The hegemony of the ethnonationalist Sinhalese line is found at all levels of society. An illuminating study of Sri Lankan school textbooks by Siriwardene (1984) reports:
“Millions of school children [are] taught, in the name of social studies, through text-books published by the state, the myths of divergent racial origins which will help to divide the Sinhalese and Tamils for more generations to come... What this lesson does is to evoke the child's memories of being frightened by his parents with threats of the mysterious and fearful `billo' to identify these bogeymen as Tamil agents, and thus to enlist the deep-seated irrational fears of early childhood for the purpose of creating apprehension and hatred of Tamils.”
Although the Tamil insurgency acknowledged military defeat on May 17, 2009, vestiges of the civil war are ubiquitous in Sri Lanka: PIC-Arun Pillai-Essex/MFAR
Referring to the exploitation of history as an instrument of divisive ethnic ideologies, Siriwardene says history texts "project an image of Sinhalese- Buddhist identity which is defined fundamentally through opposition to and struggles against Tamils in history.”
The misappropriation of education for ethno-nationalist purposes is by no means only a Sinhalese problem. Siriwardene quotes a professor who says that Tamil textbooks "[inculcate] in the Tamil child a special feeling for his or her community and language, and [help] to strengthen communal attitudes... and to foster a kind of patriotic feeling, not towards Sri Lanka but towards Tamil Nadu.” This is but one example, and a very telling one, of how deeply these divisions run and how difficult it will be to overcome them if they are entrenched in the minds of the members of both groups from childhood.
However, despite the institutionalisation of these divisions by state and community actors, the narrow categorization of current identities does not accurately reflect the lived experience of most Sri Lankans. Their reality is a much richer blend. Many people share multiple identities, loyalties, beliefs, and common cultural practices (Silva, 2002). Clear examples of a shared consciousness can be found in cultural festivals such as the Sinhalese-Tamil New Year celebrations, in the ever-popular World Cup cricket matches, and in religious practices at Kataragama, Bellanvilla, and countless other shrines around the country (Gombrich & Obeyesekere, 1988; Kapferer,1988). Despite numerous attempts on the part of leaders on boths sides to sow the seeds of division in these popular gatherings, these important cultural phenomena have been sustained.
The only way to achieve reconciliation is to address the genuine grievances of the minorities. For example, if official use of the Tamil language can be genuinely implemented, as promised under the constitution, Tamils would start to feel that they have a place in their country. However, such measures would by no means solve the problem overnight. It is the perception of being treated as second-class citizens and of being discriminated against because of their ethnicity that has caused such deep-seated resentment. Fear of being assimilated at the expense of their group identity and culture is at the heart of their struggle. However, creating an environment in which such fears would no longer have any basis in reality would entail a drastic transformation of attitude on the part of the Sinhalese community, which would have to accept the responsibility to allow for the needs of a pluralistic, multicultural polity.
Apart from the aspects of the conflict rooted in ethnic difference (whether perceived or real) and with commensurate implications for seeking prospective solutions, it is crucial to acknowledge that there are vested economic, psychological, and political interests in continuing the war. The military, security, and political establishment, as well as militant organizations, all have stakes in maintaining the status quo. Included in the perks that come from positions of power are economic benefits to be had from salaries and allowances, not to mention the myriad corrupt practices generated by times of conflict (TI, 2001). In effect, it can be said that the major organisations acting in the war perceive themselves as existentially dependent on the continuation of the conflict. This idea is not without some truth to it, thus rendering reconciliation all the more difficult due to the extremely high costs such a change in dynamics would incur for many powerful groups. Furthermore, since 9/11 Sri Lanka has been pulled into the Global War on Terror, a connection that is sure to linger as Sri Lanka’s Muslim population becomes increasingly politicised.
In addition, the geopolitical considerations of the regional superpowers and internal politics of the Indian subcontinent continue to have powerful repercussions on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately for ordinary civilians, the conflcit has become inextricably entangled in webs of international, regional, national, and local struggles for power. Appeasing and reconciling this plethora of diverging interests
will be no simple feat.
Clearly, the military defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan Army last year did not and cannot end the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese. It is a historical conflict rooted in colonial policy and driven by firmly entrenched, diametrically opposed, and mutually exclusive ethnic consciousnesses. If there is to be any progress towards peace as a conclusion to this protracted ethnic conflict, all of these vested interests and socioeconomic, historical, political, psychological, and ideological dynamics will have to be taken into account and addressed in practical, effective ways. Ideally, this would transform the underlying ethnic consciousnesses and attitudes on both sides. Despite the difficulty of this task, undermining the exclusive identities of each group in favor of a shared positive ethnic consciousness appears to be the only route to lasting peace for warravaged Sri Lanka.
For works cited: Click PDF File [ MCGILL FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW, Volume II, Issue 1 - Winter 2010]
Daya Somasundaram, is former Senior Professor of Psychiatry in the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Jaffna and psychiatric consultant who worked in northern Sri Lanka for over two decades. His research and publications focused on the psychological effects of ethnic conflict and disasters, and the treatment thereof. He is currently on an extended sabbatical, working in Australia as a consultant psychiatrist as well as treating refugees and asylum seekers who have survived torture and severe trauma, while writing a book on collective trauma.
Courtesy : Tamilweek
