Monday, 28 July 2008

nandu ooru, nari ooru


ez;L CW> ehp CW

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Saturday, 19 July 2008

Remembering Black July

At 7 years of age, going early home from school was always a thing to celebrate. It was an age where you didn’t really delve into the reasons, be it bad monsoon rains or a bomb scare, nor did you delve into its consequences, except enjoying the consequence of going home, looking forward to having a leisurely lunch and immersing oneself in the joys of reading an Enid Blyton. But on July 24, 1983 what I had imagined to be the beginning of a similar day didn’t quite turn into one. I remember my uncle turning up at school with my cousins which in itself was quite a surprise. The drive home was terrible. The streets were in chaos. Looting everywhere, shops burning and angry men walking around with clubs and knives. I still vividly remember the road streaming with milk from broken bottles and the acrid odour of smoke billowing out of buildings in black clouds....I guess it was really a black July. Confused I still didn’t understand what was going on. When I reached home my grandparents, mother and aunt were all looking terrified and helpless. My grandfather suddenly got up from his chair and asked us to free the dog. He later led us out of the house, locked it and asked us to follow him out into the lane. We then stood in the corner of the lane as if waiting for something to happen. My grandfather said, ‘its better to die together and in the open. Let everyone see what is to happen to us. It’s better than dying inside a burning house without anybody really knowing what happened to us.’ It was then that I felt a deep sense of sadness and fear but I still couldn’t understand why I was feeling this. We stood there for 10 minutes and we were suddenly surrounded by the neighbours. They were terribly shocked to see us standing out there, helpless. They took things into control and split us amongst themselves. My grandparents went with a Sinhalese family and my mother, aunt and I went with a Malay family. The men in our area saw to it that the thugs did not come in to wreak havoc. They just told them ‘this is our area. We will do the needful’, but what they did really was to protect all the Tamils who lived there. This was also strange since the area was essentially a stronghold of the UNP, the government in power at that time and the chief instigators of the communal riots. A month later we left Sri Lanka to live in India until things got better. We returned but many didn't. The first mass exodus of Tamils from Sri Lanka seeking refuge in places such as India, Europe, Australia and Canada.

We were some of the very fortunate Tamils to have survived without harm to life or property and on that sad day in July, the presence of humanism did give us all some hope. Nevertheless, we cannot also forget that thousands lost a lot in the days that followed. Death, destruction and displacement were rampant. It was the beginning of the realisation that there was really a problem in our country. It was a day when the war came home especially to the Tamils living in the South, into our rooms, into our kitchens, into us, creeping slowly into our skin.

Why did it really happen? I guess we all know it now. Nevertheless, on the 25th year of the Black July we must remember why and how it all happened and to wish that we will never experience something like it ever again. The following article by the late
Kethesh Loganathan which appeared recently in the Sri Lanka Guardian will give us a brief insight into the politics behind the 1983 progrom and its ramifications on the future of the conflict in Sri Lanka.


1983 Anti-Tamil riots and militarization of the ethnic conflict


The period immediately following the elections to the District Development Councils (DDCs) in June 1981 witnessed the further development of Tamil militant organizations - particularly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). In addition the Eelam Revolutionary Organizers (EROS), whose founder-leaders were based in London, split resulting in the formation of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). All of the above organizations, which were to play a key role in the parallel processes of militarization of the ethnic conflict as well as those of negotiations mediated by the Government of India, had succeeded in establishing areas of influences in Tamil Nadu by the late 70s.

The most telling evidence of the role of Tamil Nadu as an external sanctuary was the shoot-out at Pondy Bazar, a congested shopping area in the heart of Madras City, in May 1982, between the leaders of LTTE and PLOTE - Vellupillai Prabhakaran and Uma Maheswaran respectively. Both were arrested and later released on conditional bail. The ‘sanctuary’, then, included important Tamil Nadu politicians, with New Delhi keeping a watchful eye. It was also believed that Indian Intelligence, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), maintained contacts with the various Tamil militant organizations with the objective of keeping all options open.


In the meantime, back home, the activities of the Tamil militant organizations were no longer confined to attacks on security personnel, bank robberies and assassination of Tamil politicians belonging to the UNP and SLFP. It began to turn inward. Internecine conflicts and lamp post killings of ‘anti-social elements’ were on the increase. The Saturday Review, an English weekly coming out from Jaffna, cautioned against the above tendencies in the following words, which later turned out to be eerily prophetic: ‘The truth is that there is a new underground force in the making. an underground force without ideals, which if allowed unchecked could even bring about a state of civil strife in Jaffna and plunge the whole peninsula in chaos’.

Yet another development during this period was the widening chasm between the TULF and the militant groups which openly opposed the decision by the TULF to contest the local elections scheduled for May 1983. Further, UNP candidates were threatened and some assassinated. On April 29th, three candidates of the UNP were gunned down by the LTTE. On May 8th, at a public meeting of the TULF, Amirthalingam's vehicle was spirited away and the crowds ordered to disperse. A call for the boycott of the local elections was issued. And, unlike the DDC Elections of 1981, when more than 80% of the electorate had polled, this time more than 80% of the people decided to stay at home.


The response by the State was ambivalent. On the one hand there was a certain degree of glee in Colombo over the internecine conflict between PLOTE and LTTE and the humiliation being meted out to the TULF by the militant organizations. On the other, activities by the militant organizations were beginning to take their toll - not so much in terms of numbers - but on the morale and credibility of the Government. Five years had lapsed since the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) with hardly any signs of terrorism abating. On the contrary, there were increasing signs of legitimate dissent in the Tamil areas, manifest in public protests, demonstrations and hartals. The feeling of impotence by the State was compensated by greater repression against the civilian population.


The following excerpts from an interview given by Major General Tissa Weeratunga, Army Chief of Staff, to David Selbourne, an academic-cum-journalist who spent a considerable period of time in mid-1982 touring the troubled North-East, reveals the growing frustration in the ranks of the security forces: ‘We are not on top ... ln Jaffna. they say that a whole truck-load of troops goes out to buy a tube of toothpaste. or a box of matches ... They choose the time and place. We can only be reactive’.

On May 18 1983, after an ambush on an army convoy in Jaffna. reinforcements went on the rampage in key residential and commercial centres of Jaffna, resorting to arson and looting. Similarly on June 1st, Vavuniya Town was set ablaze, following an ambush on Air Force personnel. In the midst of growing anarchy in the ranks of the security forces. combined with conscious punitive actions against Tamil civilians, the Tamil militant organizations benefited through growing adverse international opinion against the government and support from amongst those affected. The policy of ‘terrorising into submission’ was not quite working - it only led to charges of ‘State terrorism’.


Further, the attack on Tamil students, branded as subversives and sympathizers of the ‘Tigers’ by sections of the Sinhalese students at Peradeniya University on May 11th and 12th was yet another indicator of worse things to follow. The most ominous manifestation of the carnage that was soon to follow could be found in an interview given by President Jayewardene to Ian Ward of the London Daily Telegraph. To quote: ‘I have tried to be effective for some time but cannot. I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people now ... Now we cannot think of them, not about their lives or of their opinion about us’.


The ‘final solution’, or at least an attempt at it, came in the wake of an ambush on an army convoy by the LTTE in Jaffna on July 23rd 1983. What followed was a carnage unprecedented in the sequels of anti-Tamil riots commencing in 1958. And all that the Head of State. President J. R. Jayewardene could do was to announce to the Nation that legislation would be brought before Parliament to bar political parties that espouse separation from entering the Legislature and to deprive members of such parties of their civic rights: ‘We are very sorry that this step should be taken. But I cannot see, and my Government cannot see, any other way by which we can appease the natural desire and request of the Sinhala people to prevent the country being divided, and to see that those who speak for division are not able to do so legally.’


While this was aimed at the TULF. the message was clearly one of justification rather than remorse, diversion rather than acceptance. Further, the organized nature of the anti-Tamil pogrom, which could not have taken place without an element of State-sponsorship, was attributed to the ‘Left' who were tagged with the label ‘Naxalites’. In private it seemed that J R Jayewardene was ‘disconcerted by the tragic events of the previous few days’.

Notwithstanding his official or personal views and sentiments. the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution was enacted. The amendment was passed by Parliament on 4th August 1983. It basically required any person holding elected office to take an oath affirming/swearing that he/she would not directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka. By this act the TULF ceased to be in Parliament while the Tamil politico-military organizations could not care less.

Following the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983, which led to the exodus of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees to Tamil Nadu and emotive demonstrations of cross-border ethnic affiliations, the involvement of India was, in a way, pre-destined. In addition, it was also clear that Delhi was far from pleased with Colombo's increasing closeness with countries like the USA, UK, China and Pakistan in relation to security concerns. As Prof S D Muni explains, the attempts by President Jayewardene to canvass support from these countries was perceived by Delhi as an attempt to ‘isolate India in the region by facilitating the strategic presence of the forces inimical to India's perceived security interests ... Mrs Gandhi in her telephone conversation with President Jayewardene on 5 August also strongly disapproved of Sri Lanka seeking external military support’.

At the political and diplomatic level, the first initiative by Indira Gandhi, after urging the western bloc to assume a ‘hands off' policy, was to send her Foreign Minister, Narasimha Rao, with a message to President J R Jayewardene on 28th July. It is now common knowledge that the message delivered to J R Jayewardene went beyond diplomatic niceties. Curiously, the worst carnage took place the following day, on 29th July on ‘Black Friday’, when scores of Tamils were set on fire following rumours that ‘Tigers’ had infiltrated the city.


Following a stern message from the Indian Prime Minister, the President sent his brother H W Jayewardene, a reputed lawyer, to New Delhi. A message was conveyed that the Sri Lankan Government had intended holding a round table conference to resolve the ethnic conflict, but had been unable to proceed in view of the TULF's decision not to partake in the proposed conference. The proposals that the Government had intended placing before the Conference were:

* Full implementation of the DDC laws
* The use of Tamil as a national language as provided in the constitution.
* A dialogue on amnesty, provided violence is abandoned.

* Discontinuing the active use of the armed forces in Jaffna once terrorist violence stops.
* Repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act


Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Statement in Parliament, as regards the situation in Sri Lanka, as well as the visit to New Delhi by H W Jayewardene, combined diplomacy with a veiled expression of intent. While reaffirming that India stood for the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka, Mrs Indira Gandhi announced that she was establishing a ‘Sri Lanka Relief Fund’ and called on ‘fellow citizens. including those living abroad, to contribute generously to the fund and thereby express their anguish and sympathy for the unfortunate victims of this senseless violence in a tangible and positive manner’.


As regards the proposals that President J R Jayewardene had intended placing before the round table conference, which never took place, Mrs Indira Gandhi stated: ‘I expressed my view that these proposals may not meet the aspirations of the Tamil minority. Mr Jayewardene told me that the Sri Lankan government is willing to consider any other proposals which would give the Tamil minority their due share in the affairs of their country within the framework of a united Sri Lanka.


I gave my view that discussion between the Government and the Tamil community on this broader basis would be useful and that a solution has to be sought at the conference table. I offered our good offices in whatever manner that may be needed. Mr Jayewardene expressed his appreciation of this offer made in the context of the traditional friendly ties between our countries. He later informed me that his President welcomes the offer.’

It was evident that Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi's offer to mediate was an offer that could hardly be refused by President Jayewardene. This was despite a growing anti-Indian wave in the South and J R Jayewardene's own aversion to the ‘big brother’, in this case the ‘big sister’.

The diplomatic initiative was to soon follow. G Parthasarathy or GP, as he was known in Delhi circles, was a retired diplomat and a well-known educationist. He arrived in Colombo on 25th August for discussions with President Jayewardene. His mandate was to initiate and mediate a dialogue on a political settlement between the TULF and the Sri Lankan Government.

Interestingly enough, the LTTE expressed its own reservations about any diplomatic initiative. According to a report by the Weekend Sun, a spokesman of the LTTE in Madras had asserted in a speech in Madras that: ‘The fight for Eelam will be by bullets and not by words across the table. For this we are raising a national liberation army and we need Indian help. But right now the Indian government is riding the wrong horse. It has created a serious diplomatic blunder.’ The reference was clearly to the pride of place given to the TULF in the diplomatic initiatives.

Between August and December of 1983 Parthasarathy had a series of discussions with President Jayewardene and other Sri Lankan Government officials. He similarly held discussions with leaders and representatives of political parties. Intense discussions took place with the TULF in Colombo and in New Delhi with a certain amount of publicity. However GP also held discussions with leaders and representatives of the Tamil politico-military, in particular PLOTE and EPRLF, in order to ascertain their views and opinions. 13 Such meetings were at the unofficial level and often in the wee hours of the morning at his residence. Contrary to the impression in Colombo where Parthasarathy was seen as a Brahmin -Tamil and therefore suspect, he was actually stressing the need for moderation and reconciliation.


On the other hand, a mandate had also been given to RAW, India's external intelligence service, to sustain the resistance capacity of the Tamil militant organizations as part of ‘India's double-track strategy of talking while pressurizing through the arming of the Tamil militants’. Further, RAW had to ensure that Tamil militants organizations did not find other ‘patrons’ inimical to India's interests, or strengthen themselves to the extent of making their secessionist demand a reality. The division of Sri Lanka and its repercussions in India, through Tamil Nadu, was clearly something that India wanted to avoid.

The presence of training camps in India was exposed when an Indian fortnightly, India Today, in its issue of 31st March 1984, gave details of the location of various training camps in Tamil Nadu. Although some of the locations mentioned were erroneous, the gist of the article could not be disputed. This issue was promptly taken up for discussion in the Sri Lankan Parliament. Prime Minister Premadasa declared: ‘We stand by all what we have said in this House, that is, that there are training camps on Indian soil and Indian territory. I repeat it once again. It is for the Government of India to take note of it and take suitable action. I make this statement on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka ... India cannot bully Sri Lanka. We may be a small country but we have our self-respect and we will stand up to any challenge.’


It was evident that Delhi's multi-linear agenda was beginning to spill over. The slip was beginning to show. And this provided Colombo with the pretext to seek the military support of the Western bloc and neighbouring countries in the region, (ie, Washington-London-Pretoria-Tel Aviv-Islamabad-Beijing). The opening-up of the Special Interests Section of Israel In Colombo, in return for the services of Israel's intelligence agencies, Mossad and Shin Beth, and Sri Lanka's support for Britain on the Falklands crisis at the United Nations, as a gesture of goodwill for the military assistance and training facilities provided by Britain, overtly or covertly, were clear instances of a rupture in Sri Lanka's foreign policy orientation and its previous adherence to strategic alliances within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It was also a clear manifestation of Sri Lanka being sucked into the geo-politics of the region, with extra-regional implications.

India's involvement, similarly, began to keep pace with developments at the geo-political level, as well as with developments within Sri Lanka that had a direct bearing on the Tamil Question and cross-border affiliations.


The All Party Conference (APC) met on 10th January 1984, following the initiatives by Parthasarathy. Prior to that, on 21st December 1983, President Jayewardene summoned a meeting of 8 political parties to consider the question of holding an All Party Conference on ‘the daily growing problems of the country in regard to ethnic affairs and terrorism’. Although at that meeting it was decided that the TULF, NSSP and the JVP be invited, the latter two were excluded since they stood ‘proscribed’.


The Political Parties which eventually participated included the United National Party (UNP), Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Communist Party (CPSL), Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), Democratic Workers Congress (DWC) and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). In addition, a decision was taken to widen the participants to include a medley of Buddhist, Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious organizations.

Saturday, 12 July 2008

being an asylum seeker, being a refugee: a look into the Swiss asylum system


With the increase in intra-state wars, the flow of refugees has also increased. As of end 2007 the major refugee hosting countries as listed by UNHCR[1] were Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, Islamic Republic of Iran, Germany, Jordan, United Republic of Tanzania, China, United Kingdom, Chad and the United States. In Europe, Switzerland has been a host country for refugees ever since the Holocaust, which began with the influx of Jewish refugees. A substantial drop in the number of asylum seekers to Switzerland has recently also been noticed. As per statistics recorded in 2007, around 41,062 people have applied for asylum in Switzerland[2]. Also in 2007 the first applicant from Malaysia was given refugee status within two months of his arrival in Switzerland.

Highest number of asylum seekers in Switzerland

Serbia

7,810

Iraq

3,501

Somalia

3,329

Sri Lanka

2,356

Angola

2,288

Eritrea

2,249

Congo

2,146

Bosnia

2,250

Turkey

2,094

Afghanistan

1,323

Iran

1,171

Ethiopia

1,151

China

877

Syria

793

Russia

752

Unknown nationality

752

Nigeria

409

Federal Office for Migration, as at 31.12.2007

A large number of Sri Lankan asylum seekers enter Switzerland illegally despite the presence of an Embassy in Colombo which processes individual applications providing an initial assessment of eligibility. The reason for illegal entry is widely believed to be due to the delay in processing these individual applications, some even taking up to one year. Nevertheless, there have been instances of speedy responses to applications, usually between 1 – 1 ½ months of submitting them, depending on the urgency of the situation, i.e. victims of abduction, families of people killed facing threats etc., a situation amounting to grave threat of persecution, importantly with state involvement. An essential aspect for the increase in illegal entry is also the lack of a specific case to back claims for asylum. Many Sri Lankan Tamils from the North and East are forced to illegally enter countries such as Switzerland due to general hardships faced as a result of conflict and widespread impunity. Most of these Sri Lankan Tamils also have relatives in these countries of refuge, which gives them the incentive to leave their home country. Even though these people do not have a specific individual case, the hardships that arise from living in conflict prone areas help them come up with stories that are convincing in terms of eligibility. Furthermore, Sri Lanka is currently considered as a country at war so many asylum seekers are kept back under humanitarian grounds. Illegal entrants dispose of identification papers mainly to erase evidence of the air, sea and land routes used in entering the country of asylum illegally. Countries like Switzerland are also used by asylum seekers heading to Canada or UK, in transit, and in terms of the latter many enter France and use the land route to reach UK.

Asylum seekers enter into the system through the reception centres in Basel, Chiasso, Kreuzlingen and Vallorbe. Asylum seekers enter Switzerland through its borders both legally and illegally. There are also asylum seekers who enter with the assistance of the UNHCR and those who apply through Switzerland’s Embassies situated around the world. The Embassies process the applications in close consultation with the Federal Office of Migration (FOM) in Bern and successful applicants are given tourist visas to enter Switzerland legally. These asylum seekers are then handed over to the Reception Centres and the process of seeking asylum begins thereafter. It is important to note that asylum seekers who enter legally are not guaranteed refugee status, but are merely provided with a legal entry into the country. They are then subjected to a rigorous interview process which will assess their eligibility for refugee status.

The State run reception centres can in reality be considered as detention centres, with a controlled system that ensures the containment of the asylum seekers in relation to all aspects. For example, at the Reception Centre in Kreuzlingen, asylum seekers arriving at the reception centre are subjected to a registration process, which includes security clearance, handing over electronic equipment such as mobile phones, laptops etc., handing over identification papers, passports and all documents related to the asylum seeker and his/ her family, fingerprinting and photographs. This process sometimes takes up to 6 – 7 hours excluding the break for lunch. Asylum seekers who arrive during the night after the office hours have to stay in the waiting area until the following day. They are given mattresses and blankets and have to spend the night in the glass partitioned waiting area without any privacy or comfort, under the close scrutiny of the night security personnel referred to as ‘Securitas’. No food is provided with only the availability of potable water from the toilets. A family from Sri Lanka who arrived in Switzerland in 2007, re-call the initial shock of their first few hours as asylum seekers. ‘Our application in Sri Lanka was processed very fast. The Embassy hardly gave us information in relation to what to expect in Switzerland. We wanted some information since we were travelling with two very small children but they just said that everything will be taken care of. We arrived in Zürich late in the night and were met by an official from an agency dealing with the logistics for asylum seekers. The official handed over our train tickets and helped us board the train we had to then proceed to Kreuzlingen by ourselves. It was very difficult for us, with heavy bags and two tired children. We missed our connecting train and had to take a taxi which cost us Fr. 50. When we arrived in Kreuzlingen badly needing a rest we were asked to sleep in the waiting area. We knew it was not going to be easy but we would have been better prepared if there was some indication for us from the Embassy, we would at least have booked a flight that arrived during the day.’ Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the increase in violence and involving in illegal activities by asylum seekers have also contributed to the need for strict control in reception centres like this.

The Kreuzlingen Reception Centre, like other reception centres accommodates the asylum seekers in dormitory style rooms, with the women and men put up separately. There are no provisions for families to stay together. At 8 p.m. the lights go off and breakfast is at 7.30 a.m. where the asylum seekers line up in front of a large eating area and are served their food by the kitchen crew. Similarly there are times for lunch and supper. The rooms cannot be used during the day especially during the mid-day cleaning time. The asylum seekers are also expected to do menial jobs like cleaning the play ground area, the rooms, stairways, windows, the toilets and the bathrooms. The communal bathrooms are divided into male and female areas and are locked during the day. They are opened early in the morning and late in the evening. There are specific times in the morning and in the afternoon when the asylum seekers are allowed to leave the centre and move around in the town. Each asylum seeker is given a weekly allowance calculated at Fr. 3 per day. Bringing in food and drink items are also restricted especially chocolates and alcohol but it is quite ironic how certain asylum seekers manage to smuggle in drugs and mobile phones. Once you leave the centre you cannot return until the stipulated time has lapsed nor can you arrive late. Asylum seekers who have family or friends living in Switzerland can stay with them on weekends. The centre has a large outsider area with a play area for children, which is used by all asylum seekers during the day, if the weather permits, as an alternate to the large eating area which also functions as a TV room. Visits are also made by representatives from NGO’s such as Caritas to talk with the asylum seekers about living conditions and the provision of free legal advice which is also provided by them if required.

The initial interview for an asylum seeker is held at the reception centre and is usually held on the 5th day of arrival. The maximum period of stay for an asylum seeker would be 60 days. Usually, asylum seekers arriving legally or family members of those who have already obtained refugee status are transferred to a canton within 15 – 20 days. They only have their initial interview whereas illegal entrants (sans papiers) have around 3 interviews sometimes including their final interview before they are assigned a canton. The legal entrants have their final interview in Bern after which a decision is made on their application for refugee status. A translator is provided for all interviews. Illegal entrants who have their final interview at the reception centres have it in the presence of officials from the Federal Office for Migration and NGO Representatives i.e. Caritas. In the Sri Lankan context many asylum seekers have had bad experiences in terms of the translators provided by the Kreuzlingen Centre, usually a Swiss resident of Sri Lankan origin. One particular translator was known to have been very condescending and quite biased in terms of his interactions making the asylum seekers feel threatened and at unease. His conversations and body language with the officer conducting the interview was very free and gave the asylum seekers being interviewed a feeling that he had the power to influence the officer. A young male asylum seeker who experienced this first hand stated, ‘I was very upset at the way he was behaving especially being a fellow Sri Lankan. He was intent on making my claims sound as if they were false. I just wanted him to be impartial and to do his job without concentrating on intimidating me’. Subsequently, a group of Sri Lankan asylum seekers formally handed over a petition against this particular translator. This gives us an insight into how far the politics of a country goes, with individual attitudes impregnating a system that is believed to be unbiased and impartial.

Next the asylum seeker is assigned a canton. After a train journey to the canton (train ticket provided), the asylum seeker is required to register with the Cantonal Office which gives them information in relation to where they are to be housed. The asylum seeker then has to find his/ her way to the assigned ‘transit centre/ camp’. There are many transit camps in each canton for Phase I of the asylum process. In Zurich city there are 4 main transit centres Durchgangzentrum Embrach 1, Durchgangzentrum Embrach 2, Durchgangzentrum Hegnau and Durchgangazentrum Regensbergstrasse run by the AOZ, an independent public institute which works for the city of Zurich as well as for other cantons and municipalities of the Swiss Federation. AOZ also runs transit centres for gemeindes or municipalities in canton Zürich specifically in Bäretswil, Fehraltdorf, Fischenthal, Geroldswil, Gossau, Hinwil, Hittnau, Nürensdorf, Oberengstringen, Oetwil an der Limmat, Pfäffikon, Schwerzenbach, Sternenberg, Unterengstringen, Volketswil, Wald, Wangen-Brüttisellen and Weiningen.

These transit centres usually house individual and family asylum seekers on a sharing basis. For example, in Durchgangzentrum Regensbergstrasse a large apartment is divided into two sections, on that houses families and female asylum seekers and another section that houses single males with few sections for families as well. The centre has two office rooms, a large basement area for asylum seekers to meet, a class room, a TV room, an internet cafe, a billiards room, a laundry room and washroom with toilets. The internet cafe and billiards room are also used during the day to conduct German classes for asylum seekers. The German classes are divided into 3 levels, basic, medium and advanced and are currently being taught by three young and dynamic teachers. The classes are mandatory and the language of instruction is German. A play room for young children is also available, with parents assigned to a roster to take care of the children while the other parents attend German classes. There is wide criticism amongst asylum seekers that no support is given in languages such as English during lessons but this manages to give an extra push to motivate the asylum seekers to learn the language. Unfortunately, language classes are not taught in a uniform manner in all transit centres lacking regularity and thereby stifling interest.

Asylum seekers live in the transit centre for a minimum of 6 months which is the official limit. At the end of 6 months the asylum seeker is transferred to another gemeinde or municipality as per Phase II of the asylum process. Some stay longer than 6 months depending on the availability of vacant slots as per their individual needs. A meeting conducted by the transit centre’s staff to assess the individual needs of the asylum seeker in terms of the impending transfer i.e. facilities for children, not wanting to share accommodation with asylum seekers from their country of origin, non-smoking environment etc. The information gathered at the meeting is then forwarded to the Cantonal Office which identifies a suitable gemeinde for the asylum seeker. The asylum seekers are put up in private houses run by the municipality usually sharing with other asylum seekers. These places vary in comparison. After 6 months of registering, an asylum seeker is permitted to work either full or part time. Those who cannot find jobs with private businesses are able to work under the Gemeinnützige Einsatzplätze (GEP) which is also administered by AOZ and identifies non-profit jobs for asylum seekers and refugees. An allowance according to the hours worked are usually paid and those who travel to the Zurich city from semi-urban areas of the canton are given an allowance for a monthly travel ticket. Those who obtain full time work and remove themselves from social assistance need to find suitable accommodation and vacate the accommodation provided by the gemeinde. Accommodation is very difficult to find, with the Swiss reluctant to rent out to ‘ausländer’ or foreigners. There is also a tendency for Swiss homeowners to prefer renting out their apartments to asylum seekers or refugees with full time jobs than those dependent on social assistance provided by the government.

There is no specific time line for a decision on a refugee application to be made. Both legal and illegal entrant asylum seekers have to wait a minimum of 9 months for a decision to be made with the exception if the case relating to the Malaysian asylum seeker mentioned earlier. The maximum limit is arguable with some taking even 5 years or more. Usually a final interview held in Bern will determine the final decision. Sometimes, asylum seekers who have already had their final interview in the reception centre are given a decision without the Bern interview. If the decision is negative there is a provision for an appeal usually within 30 days. Usually, asylum seekers with a negative decision make their appeal through a lawyer. Organisations like Caritas provide free legal aid but some asylum seekers prefer to hire private lawyers. If the appeal is given a negative response the asylum seeker will be deported to the country of his/ her origin.

Swiss attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees are fairly reserved bordering on hostile. This is due to the deep attachment of the Swiss towards their; the strength of which they feel is being eroded by the constant influx of foreigners. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the migrants have been filling in the work space left by the aging Swiss population. A part of the hostility is justified due to the increase seen in terms of crime in a country which is considered fairly safe and trouble free. Many asylum seeker and refugees especially from Balkan countries such as Kosovo and some African countries involve in criminal activities constantly creating trouble for the centres they live in and other occupants. Anti-migrant notions are also fuelled by political parties such as the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkpartei –SVP) which has been accused of racism and fanning Islamophobia, and is also currently the ruling party of Switzerland.

Being an asylum seeker and the process of becoming a refugee is like being born again but the period of confinement is the most trying part of it all. Mark Raper[3] sums this up succinctly, when he says, ‘to be a refugee is to live in the margins of society, excluded from political or social importance. The man or woman who is a refugee may one time have been important, once enjoyed a role in life. In a camp of displaced people, each on is a former something; a former housewife, doctor, farmer, minister of state. Each is a person in waiting, dependent on another’s decision.’



[1] 2007 Global Trends, UNHCR (June 2008)

[2] Bundesamt für Migration (Federal Office for Migration - FOM)statistics

[3] Former Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) Director, New Scenarios for Old: Populations Displace, May 1998

Wednesday, 9 July 2008

Trauma in the Vanni: Human Grist to the Mills of Dual Hypocrisy

University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) Sri Lanka
UTHR(J)

Information Bulletin No. 46
Date of Release
: 8th July 2008

A resident of the Vanni told us, You cannot imagine life there. It is unbearable, the constant fear of aerial attack. Everyone is mentally killed every day, women, children and infants. Some bombs are set to penetrate the soil and explode. You could then see a hole about 30 feet deep and the water spilling in as though a well had been dug. Some bombs are set to explode 15 feet above the ground. Usually about four bombs are dropped on the target area. Then nothing would be left standing in about two acres of land. It would simply be scorched earth. The third kind of bomb explodes on striking the ground. Its vibration, along with a heavy gust of wind could be felt in a radius of two miles. Most of the house windows would be shattered.”

To read the full report, containing the following sub-sections please visit http://www.uthr.org/bulletins/Bul46.htm


1. Anger and Despair over Aerial Terror

2. Slaughter of Innocents and the Economically Marginalised

3. How the LTTE survives? – People Believe in the Struggle though not in the LTTE

4. The Escapees

5. Life in the Vanni

6. The Government and the Tamils

6. 1 Sampoor

6.2 Democracy for the East

6.3 We Choose Your Leaders and Fixers

7. The Breakdown of Constitutional Norms

8. No hope for a political Settlement in the Near Term: Keeping the Flame Alive



Sunday, 6 July 2008

Karuna Returns

So Karuna Amman, now popularly known as the ’abusive ex-commander’, has returned to Sri Lankan soil. What will the next move be? Re-vamping the party and participating in the next Parliamentary Elections are also on the cards for Karuna and the dance of Karuna-Pillayan-Mangalam Master and the Rajapakse’s have begun. See below a previous post by SahaSamvada re-published in relation to the current context:



Insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction for any criminal offences in the UK – Crown Prosecution Services, UK: The Release of Karuna Amman
(Original Post - May 11, 2008)

Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna Amman is alleged to have returned to Sri Lanka to continue as the leader of the TMVP. The victory of the GoSL – TMVP alliance in the Eastern Elections of May 10, 2008 seems to have created a suitable environment for the return of this renegade leader. But what does this mean to the people of the Eastern province and to the rest of Sri Lanka? Would this be another episode in the shadow war that has been waging throughout the country or is it an opportunity towards the creation of a more democratic atmosphere? Was there really a Karuna-Pillayan split within the TMVP or was it really part of a larger plan in an attempt towards ‘democratising violence’?

As highlighted by the Human Rights Watch (Reuters, May 9, 2008), ‘Tamil Tiger forces under Karuna's command were directly involved in some of the worst crimes of Sri Lanka's ongoing civil war, including torture, summary execution, and use of children as soldiers. Because his armed group fought against the LTTE in recent years, the Sri Lankan government did not prosecute him’. This statement despite of its accuracy in fact, in reality only provides a cursory and one-sided explanation to the real reason as to why the GoSL did not attempt to prosecute Karuna, by providing the necessary support to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, this incident cannot better clarify the fact that the GoSL has more blood on its hands than it is given credit for. As with the case of the Afghan warlord, Faryadi Sarwar Zardad, there was no support from the GoSL in bringing Karuna Amman to justice under British law which has the jurisdiction to prosecute for serious violations of international law especially war crimes committed elsewhere. But how was this potential prosecution thwarted? Was it really the lack of ‘insufficient evidence’ or was it due to the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Rajapakse Government? What does Mahinda’s impending visit to the UK reveal? How can one believe that there was insufficient evidence when thousands have been subject to human rights violations under the leadership of Karuna, pre and post LTTE? And what about those who have fled the country, wouldn’t these people have come forward, given the fact that there are no witness protection programmes whatsoever to protect victims and their families in Sri Lanka?

The scepticism that permeates these recent developments can only be diminished if the abductions, extortions, recruitment and extra-judicial killings stop. Have we just given the GoSL and the TMVP the mandate to carry out these atrocities in a ‘democratic’ manner? What will the ramifications be if this becomes the reality, in finding a political solution to this conflict?


Photo courtesy: transcurrents.com

Thursday, 3 July 2008

Women of War


In Batticaloa, a woman sits as the twilight sets, besides her dead husband staring unconsciously into his sunken eyes as the bloody halo slowly grows darker on the sand under his head, in Colombo a mother sobs relentlessly for her abducted son her face pressed against the worn out cement, in Trincomalee a woman puts up a futile fight to stop the ‘boys’ from taking away her 12 year old boy and deep in the remoteness of Matara a newly married woman reads a telegram informing the death of her soldier husband, a female Black Tiger cadre wakes up to another day unsure of surviving it, and a pregnant woman sits uncomfortably in a heaving boat looking at the never-ending sea hoping for a glimpse of her refuge, Rameswaram.

What does it feel to be a woman of war? Whether you are living in Mannar, Trincomalee, Puttalam, Moneragala, Colombo or as a refugee in India, Switzerland or Canada, or as a migrant housemaid in Kuwait or Cyprus, you are a woman of war. The war is your second skin, like being Sri Lankan, like being a Tamil, like being brown, like being black, like being yellow. They are all second, third and fourth and ....., skins, not something you can peel or tear off. Gone are the days when the war was a remote, disjointed occurrence. Today the war is everywhere. From the minute you wake up, to when you get into a bus, when you stand in the railway station after a hard day's work waiting for a train, as you wait for your child to come home from school, as you try to ignore the looks the ‘whites’ give you when you get into a bus or a train, when you watch your husband give the ‘boys’ their monthly payment, when you walk with the other women in their yellow and red saris in a Pongu Thamil procession, as you watch your daughter’s cultural item on the stage at the Maha Veerar Day celebration. The war is everywhere and we are all women of war.

People talk about human resilience. That we pick up the pieces and forge ahead. But is resilience alone sufficient to keep us going, and will this resilience always be with us? Will we not break under the pressure of this resilience at some point? Will this resilience erode us of our right to be human? Will it lose itself to indifference and apathy? And what will the ultimate repercussions of this be, especially for our society? Today this resilience is no longer good for us. It has sold itself to indifference and apathy and has eroded the need in us to fight for a better society, to say no to the violence, to the killings in the name of race, religion and caste. As human beings we make mistakes, miss opportunities, but we also have the ability to learn from our mistakes, to learn lessons from our history, not to repeat them. Our beliefs change as they are constantly challenged by what is happening in the world, as new truths and atrocities are revealed. Women of war fill into many roles, as mothers, as wives, as activists, as soldiers, as refugees. It is only in a war situation that a woman is more than the equal of a man, as a victim or as a survivor. But what would be our ideal role? Would it be as a fearless activist who brings to light the atrocities against her people? Like Rajani Rajasingam Thiranagama? A woman who realised that the rebellion for the rights of her people, was really a rebellion gone wrong, and sought to record the atrocities against her peoples by the Government as well as the militant groups who were the pilots of 'rebellion' and paid the ultimate price for it. Like Rajani there are many exceptional women creating a special niche in the history of the war in Sri Lanka, fighting for the rights of the peoples, fearlessly exposing the perpetrators despite the severe culture of impunity. But, what about the scores of real life women of war who stay muted, fading into the bullet ridden walls of destroyed homes, and the crowded alleys of the cities? As they suffer in silence, do they not decide the tomorrows of their children? As they turn a blind eye on the atrocities around them aren’t they depriving a better future from their children? What can they do that is different, without really having to be exceptional? By being a mother, a wife, a sister or a friend cannot these women of war really become exceptional women? Maybe the answer lies in the issue of resilience, in not letting it become indifference or apathy. In knowing that the war is in reality futile and that there must be a change in our beliefs for the better and not for the worse, because as women of war, we have a bigger and more important role, as mothers and wives and sisters and friends, in nurturing attitudes and a culture of progressiveness. So as women of war can we not really be, ‘exceptional’?

Image: © Tanuja Thurairajah