Indo-Sri Lankan Political Dynamics

by Tanuja Thurairajah

An ambiguous but essential aspect of the Sri Lankan conflict is the role of India. From the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 to the IPKF disaster that followed it, the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the subsequent ban of the LTTE in 1991 the political dynamics between the two countries have had serious and deep ramifications on the Sri Lankan conflict.

At present the trade relationship between Sri Lanka and India can be considered as healthy with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of March 2000 and the finalisation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Cepa) on the cards. India is Sri Lanka’s highest trading partner and some new trade initiatives are being made by Sri Lankan investors on Indian soil at present. There have also been some issues related to fishermen and the International Maritime Boundary Line, nevertheless the relationship between these two countries go beyond the economic and trade aspects and have been grappling with some issues of immense sensitivity and importance[1] especially in terms of India’s role in Sri Lanka’s protracted ethnic conflict, a relationship which has been under constant scrutiny of all interested parties.

Lost opportunity
The first attempt at a conflict resolution mechanism was spearheaded by the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi with the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 29, 1987. It sought to achieve

1. The preservation of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka (vide Clause 1.1);

2. The nurturing of the distinct cultural and linguistic identity of each ethnic group (vide Clause 1.3), within the framework of a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society (vide Clause 1.2), where all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony and prosper and fulfill their aspirations (vide Clause 1.5); and

3. The recognition of the Northern and Eastern Provinces as “areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking peoples”.

The LTTE which had forced its way towards obtaining recognition as the dominant politico-military organisation managed to cement this status within the proposed interim administration with a quota of 12 seats. But as with many incidents in the history of Sri Lankan politics, the LTTE and the then GoSL lost another opportunity of working towards a solution to the conflict by disagreeing on the appointment of the Chief Administrator in terms of the interim administration.

India’s secret role in the Sri Lankan peace process and Tamil Nadu politics
News of India’s supposed direct intervention in the Sri Lankan peace process has begun circulating in the Indian web/ blogsphere. In a web report titled ‘India’s covert role in Sri Lanka’s Ceasefire’, M. R. Narayan Swamy examines how the whole peace process came into being, closely supervised by the India’s National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra. He states that India was behind the peace process from its very inception, from identifying an international facilitator, Norway, due to its supposed lack of vested interest, to working with both Kumaranatunga and Wickremesinghe in taking the initiative forward[2].

India has held throughout that a military end to the Sri Lankan predicament is unrealistic. Nevertheless, India’s stand is steeped in ambiguity especially given the dimension that the politics of Tamil Nadu present. Karunanidhi has always been vocal in terms of the whole ‘self-determination’ issue of the Sri Lankan Tamils but has not clearly defined whether this is to be realised through a separate statehood or through the devolution of power. Furthermore, the whole refugee influx and its recent increase has put pressure on the Tamil Nadu government, not only in terms of providing for the refugees but most importantly in terms of tackling the infiltration of the Tigers into Tamil Nadu along with these refugees. This in turn has increased controls on the refugees themselves making their situation deplorable. India has provided refuge for many refugees from Nepal and Bangladesh, but the violent actions of the LTTE have been testing the patience of India which is being increasingly forced to consider the Sri Lankan refugees as a problem and not as an opportunity to extend their goodwill towards their fellow Tamils. The assassinations of Pathmanaba of EPRLF & his 12 friends and the brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi are some of the gruesome highlights of LTTE atrocities on Indian soil.

Furthermore as former IPKF Commander Ashok Mehta states “the fact is, pro-LTTE parties in Tamil Nadu (who are critical of Karunanidhi) like Vaiko’s MDMK will also take full advantage of the situation.” Vaiko has been intensely vocal in his support for the LTTE and has created a popular culture within the Tamil Nadu politics to openly support the politics of the LTTE, with the belief that all Tamils are united in their support for the LTTE, and through this display their support to the fight for the rights of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The recent issue of the film titled ‘Prabhakaran’ clearly highlights this phenomenon where a group of actors and technicians led by Dravidian Tamil Movement (DTM) leader Suba Veerapandian and Thol Thirumavalavan of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), came together in protest and were responsible for the attacks instigated against the Director of the film, Thushara Peiris. They have now obtained an interim stay from the City Civil Court in Chennai. It is ironic that Thirumavalavan’s party organised a conference on January 25, 2008 titled ‘Redeem the freedom of Expression’ where he states that "Any move to suppress those expressing moral support to Tamil Eelam and LTTE is violation of all tenets of democracy and humanism, and will border on fascism.", while he and his supporters have clearly violated the ‘freedom of expression’ rights of Peiris. This blind and almost fanatic support of the ‘Tamil cause’ by some political elements in Tamil Nadu further complicates the whole issue in terms of an Indian intervention in the future towards a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The 13^th Amendment -India has been clearly supporting the implementation of the 13^th Amendment as the basis for a negotiated settlement to the conflict and welcomed the GoSL’s decision to implement this. Nevertheless in reality the 13^th Amendment has not been fully implemented. India’s role in pushing for the full implementation of the 13^th Amendment as well as in encouraging the GoSL to consider the adoption of the improvements suggested in the 17^th Amendment as the basis for a negotiated settlement is paramount.

Weapons procurement & Pakistan
The present GoSL and its links with the Pakistani Government regarding the procuring of weapons, where India’s refusal to provide Sri Lanka with ‘lethal’ weapons has clearly become an opportunity for Pakistan in terms of bruising India’s image as a noticeable regional power without really appearing to do so. Sri Lanka’s weapons business with Pakistan dates back to 1999 but in terms of the present context Sri Lanka has ‘requested $25 million worth of 81 mm, 120 mm and 130 mm mortar ammunition to be delivered within a month.....The Pakistani military has agreed to supply the ammunition on an emergency basis from its War Wastage Reserve, maintained at several army depots.’[3] Nevertheless, a major part of the training of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, i.e. upto 53%, is carried out in India and Sri Lanka turning towards Pakistan for weapons procurement has created a sense of frustration within the Indian government.

India’s role is clearly crucial. With the failure of the Western powers in facilitating a negotiated solution, and in order to curb the current situation of democratic paralysis and the breakdown of the rule of law, India as a regional power must refrain from procrastinating its direct intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict.

---

[1] Political issues overshadow trade ties between India and Sri Lanka (http://www.livemint.com/2008/04/25223838/Political-issues-overshadow-tr.html)

[2] India’s covert role in Sri Lanka’s Ceasefire, M. R. Narayan Swamy, New Delhi, February 17, 2008 (http://www.newkerala.com/one.php?action=fullnews&id=23353)

[3] Lanka orders emergency Pak military supplies, Daily Times, Pakistan, April 4, 2008 (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\04\04\story_4-4-2008_pg7_8)